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INTRODUCTION

In a thoughtful analysis published in a recent issue of the Journal
of World Trade Law, Professor Cletus Coughlin undertook an economic overview of the joint venture legislation in Yugoslavia in light of
a relatively disappointing foreign response.' In particular, Professor
Coughlin noted the inherent difficulty in attempting to integrate the
Yugoslav system of workers' self-management with the management
rights of foreign entity participants.' Problems particularly have arisen
when the workers' representatives on a joint venture's works council

1. Coughlin, An Economic Analysis of Yugoslav Joint Ventures, 17 J.
L. 12 (1983).
2. Id. at 15.

TRADE
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WORLD
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have continually frustrated the plans or proposals of the foreign management representatives, 3 perhaps because of the different economic
goals of a Yugoslav worker and a Western capitalist investor.,
This motivational gap is illustrated by an analysis borrowed from
one observer6 that the foreign investor will aim to maximize profits
whereas the Yugoslav worker representatives will prefer to maximize

income per worker. As a result, "the Yugoslav partner will desire to
employ less labor than would the Western partner."6 Professor Coughlin notes that although the assumption on which this conclusion is

based is frequently made, it is not entirely satisfactory, but then concludes that there is some logical support for it. 7 His ultimate conclu-

sion, however, is that "a deeper understanding of the interrelationships
between the legislation and certain economic results is possible" and
that, "[a]s always, there is more research to be done." 8
This comment will expand on Professor Coughlin's remarks by analyzing in greater depth the assumption of a motivational gap between

Western and Yugoslav joint venture partners, particularly regarding
employment and production levels and investment preferences or bi-

ases.9 It is hoped that these observations, albeit theoretical and primarily economic in nature, may further the research efforts Professor
Coughlin called for to bring law and practice into closer harmony.

II.

METHODOLOGY

In order to examine the effects of workers' self-management on the
behavior of a joint venture firm, I have attempted to place the joint

3. Id. at 16. But see Euromarket News (CCH) No. 817, Rep. No. 509, at 8
(Sept. 11, 1984) (reporting on proposals to amend Yugoslav joint venture legislation to
help alleviate certain problems perceived as inhibiting Western joint venture equity
participation).
4. Id. at 23.
5. Brada, Markets, Property Rights, and the Economics of Joint Ventures in Socialist Countries, 1 J. Comp. ECON. 167 (1977), cited in Coughlin, supra note 1, at 23.
6. Id.
7. Id. In a subsequent comment, two other observers pointed out that the goals or
objectives of actual Western investors are even more diverse than might otherwise be
assumed. Artisien & Buckley, Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia: Comment, 18 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 163, 164-65 (1984).
8. Brada, supra note 5, at 21.
9. This article will not discuss the Yugoslav joint venture legislation itself. For an
historical perspective on that subject, see Djurisic, Tax and Legal Aspects of Joint
Ventures Under Yugoslav Law, 73-79 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 9 (1973). See generally
Zoubek, Joint Ventures in East Europe, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 427 (1975);
Sukijasovic, Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in Yugoslavia, in EAST-WEST TRADE
82 (K. Grzybowski ed. 1973).
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venture firm within a control context by comparing it to firms operating
without self-management but in a similar economic framework. I have
done so because the extensive research done on comparing workers'
self-management with both pure capitalism (which only exists in theory) and economic systems using rigid central planning yields the most
valid results when it does not take into account the influence of other
factors, some of which may be derivatives of the Yugoslav market socialist system.
For purposes of a comparison, I have therefore chosen as a "control" the Hungarian economic system embodied in the New Economic
Mechanism ("NEM"), 0 since both the NEM and Yugoslav systems
are set in a market socialism framework. But for the presence of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia, the differences between the two
are in degree rather than in kind.
III.

THE MARKET SOCIALIST MODEL

Some background discussion of the theory behind market socialism itself is necessary to make the comparison suggested above and to

analyze the factors which affect the structure of workers' self-management. Market socialism has been described as being comprised of "(1)
public ownership and (2) limited inequity in income distribution with
(3) the use of markets and prices to allocate resources and goods.""
The first two elements are, of course, basic to any socialist theory and
are derived from normative judgments of ethical and social values. 2
Socialist philosophers and economists also assume that these two elements increase global social welfare and reduce the negative aspects of
market imperfections.' 3 However, insofar as these two conditions may
foster rapid economic growth, it is not necessarily because they contrib-

ute to an inherently more efficient form of economic organization.
Rather, theorists believe that they result in a positive impact on worker
satisfaction and hence productivity." ' The third factor, the introduction

10. See Liebman, Book Review, 16 HARV. INT'L L. J. 772 (1975).
11. Bornstein, Socialist Market Economy, inCOMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS:
MODELS AND CASES 60 (M. Bornstein ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as COMPARATIVE
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS].

12. See generally MARXIST SOCIAL THOUGHT (R. Freedman ed. 1968).

13. For example, Lerner states: "If it is impossible, on any division of income, to
discover which of any two individuals has a higher marginal utility of income, the probable value of total satisfactions is maximized by dividing income evenly." A. LERNER,
29 (1944) (emphasis in original).
14. Reducing "alienation" has been shown to have a positive effect on productivity in U.S. experiments, as well. It is possible, however, that income equality may actuTHE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF WELFARE ECONOMICS
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of market forces, entails a more direct attempt to increase economic
efficiency. Hence, market socialism attempts to rationalize the socialist
system to meet the competitive demands of a modern industrial
society. 15
With the introduction of a market and more decentralized decision-making, it is hoped, in theory at least, that the rigidity of a centrally planned economy will be avoided. Nonetheless, the system still
resorts to some level of central planning in order to provide the necessary direction and impetus for development and to avoid what are
viewed as the most undesirable social consequences of capitalism. 6 But
with market-determined prices providing instantaneous information on
relative scarcities, the task of allocating resources is bound to be handled more efficiently and with fewer burdens on the central planners.7
The actual blend of economic plan and market aspects can vary.
Jan Drewnowski has outlined three ideal-types, all of which embody
some degree of state and consumer preference fulfillment. 8 In what he
calls a "first-degree market economy," the quantities of goods are fixed
and the only choice left to the consumer is what to purchase from
among the supply presented to him. Both Yugoslavia and Hungary are
far beyond this stage. In a "second-degree market economy," consumer
preferences influence what goods will be produced within the constraints of central resource allocation. Finally, in the third and highest
degree of market socialism, the central planners allocate investment resources according to macro-sectors (e.g., consumption, producer-goods
and so forth). Consumer preferences in this model determine the pat-

ally reduce incentive sufficient to counterbalance the increased productivity which results from reduced alienation. See generally W. FAUNCE, PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL

SOCIETY (1968) for a more in-depth treatment of alienation.
15. Decentralization of economic decision-making, as manifested by market socialism, may also be viewed as the natural result of modernization since the latter has a
democratizing effect on economic systems in general. This effect may be attributed to
the more differentiated social structure which modernization generates. Smelser, Mechanisms of Change and Adjustment to Change, in POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND SO-

CIAL CHANGE 32 (J. Finkle & R. Gable eds. 2d ed. 1971).
16. This is precisely the aim of both the Yugoslav and Hungarian reform programs. In the latter, the NEM "represent[s an effort to combine the advantages of
centralized planning and market incentives." Berend, The Historical Background of
the Recent Economic Reforms in East Europe (The Hungarian Experiences), 2 E.
EUR. Q. 76 (1968). The same applies in Yugoslavia. See Dunn, Ideology and Organization in Socialist Yugoslavia: Modernization and the Obsolescence of Praxis, 1972
COMP. COMMUNISM 25.
17. Hayek, The Price System as a Mechanism for Using Knowledge, in COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 28-30.

18. Drewnowski, The Economic Theory of Socialism: A Suggestion for Reconsideration, in COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 124-25.
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tern of new investment among various industries. It is this third type of
economy which is commonly known as market socialism.
In the classic formulation of market socialism, consumers through
their decisions in the marketplace determine which goods will be produced, as well as the amount of those goods.' 9 Hence, prices of consumer goods are set by the interplay of supply and demand, as are the
costs (or price) of labor and services.20 The central planners maintain
their control over the direction of the economy by:
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Setting the prices of producer goods by a series of successive
approximations at such a point that supply will just satisfy
demand;
Imposing administrative directives on enterprise managers to
use that method of production which minimizes cost while
producing that quantity which equalizes marginal cost and
21
price;
Distributing social dividends in such a way as to reduce the
disparity in income resulting from a market-determined labor
wage, but having no influence on any worker's occupational
choice;
Deciding upon the rate of investment which will yield the desired future growth and directing this investment into priority
areas; and
Utilizing economic controls such as fiscal, monetary and credit

19. See 0. LANGE & F.
143 (B. Lippincott ed. 1938).

TAYLOR, ON THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM

57-

20. In this model, prices are centrally fixed and output decentralized. An alternative model could presume more decentralized prices. See LERNER, supra, note 13, at
62-65; Wiles, Rationality, the Market, Decentralization,and the Territorial Principle,
in VALUE AND PLAN: ECONOMIC CALCULATION AND ORGANIZATION IN EASTERN EuROPE 210 n. 8 (G. Grossman ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as VALUE AND PLAN]. For
more information, see Balassa, Economic Reform in Hungary, 37 ECONOMICA 1
(1970); Lorince, Hungary's Canny Liberalization, 69 NEW STATESMAN 502 (1970);
Nagy, Hungarian Economic Reform, Past and Future, 61 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers
and Proceedings) 430 (1971); and Racz, Assessing Hungary's Economic Reforms, 17
E. EUR. 2 (1968).

21. A form of "market socialism in reverse" has also been suggested in which the
central planners set output targets, raising them to meet excess demand and lowering
them when excess supply occurs. Price is therefore set to equal marginal cost at the
market determined output. Of course, if the planners desire a certain output yet direct

managers to maximize profits, prices must be set so that the demand and supply of
both inputs and outputs are at the point where the firm's profits are maximized. If
imperfect market conditions exist, a divergence from the point of maximum consumer
welfare will therefore result. See Ward, The Planners' Choice Variables, in VALUE
AND PLAN,

supra note 20, at 138 and 149-50.
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encourage
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YUGOSLAV MARKET SOCIALISM

A.

Development

Having established an admittedly simplified version of a theoretical market socialist system (along with theoretical variations on the
theme), the market socialist variations in the two economic systems of
Yugoslavia and Hungary can now be examined at greater length.
Looking first to Yugoslavia, the genesis of its market socialism is found
in the introduction of workers' self-management in 1950.22 By 1952,
social programs abolished the distribution plan, decentralized pricing
decisions to the enterprise level and eliminated detailed output quotas.
Decisions on wage scales were also decentralized somewhat, although
the State reserved the right of direct intervention. The dismantling of
the supply (distribution) system meant that the central government was
no longer intimately involved in every major economic decision. Of
course, informal mechanisms such as taxation and credit controls were
still available to direct the functioning of the economy. The decentralization movement was nonetheless a significant step, as it enabled more
account to be taken of the local economies at different locations within
the nation at various points in time. It also helped to eliminate many of
the inefficiencies and bottlenecks which arose from the rigid hierarchy
23
of all-embracing central planning.
The impetus for this drastic shift towards decentralization and a
socialist market arose from Yugoslavia's 1948 expulsion from the
Cominform.2 4 A complete revamping of the economic system was necessary for the country to maintain its independence from Soviet hegemony. It is possible, of course, that such a change would have occurred
eventually because Yugoslavia's experience with a Soviet-type command economy
[was] nothing short of catastrophic. Many industries [were] shat-

22. This was not the first experiment with works councils. They were introduced
in Russia in 1905 and again between 1917-20, in Hungary in 1918-19, and in Spain in
1936. However, Yugoslavia was the first to institute the system on a long-term nationwide scale.
23. See Brown & Neuberger, Basic Featuresof a Centrally Planned Economy, in
COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 105-08, for a description of some

of the undesired consequences of a centrally planned economy.
24. F. SINGLETON, TWENTIETH CENTURY YUGOSLAVIA 169 (1976).
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tered, public utilities [were] in a decrepit state, agricultural productivity [had] declined, and the standard of living [had] been lowered. Furthermore, these negative achievements of the Yugoslav
Communist economic experiment [were] bought at a tremendous
cost.25
At any rate, Yugoslavia's experiment continued and, for various
political reasons, the Soviets could not interfere directly.2 6 Each firm's
management board, chosen by its respective workers' council, drew up
both the basic and monthly operating plans and made final decisions on
appointments and labor standards. After 1953, the local territorial government, in consultation with the workers' council, appointed the Director, in contrast to previous ministry appointments. The Director
could hire, fire and transfer workers, carry out administrative rulings,
run the day-to-day operations, and legally contract in the name of the
firm.
Early in 1954, price controls on production goods were actually
abandoned, but this was soon found to be unworkable given the still
unstable and imperfect markets. 7 However, two-thirds of the prices for
production goods remained controlled until 1962. But again, in the
early 1960s, economic liberalization resumed. By 1967, only half of all
goods were under price controls and general wage controls had been
relinquished. The use of taxes became more prevalent as a substitute
for direct allocation of investment resources and the Government's involvement in credit policy was also reduced to informal control over
lending banks and the acquisition of foreign exchange.
B.

Reforms

The key to Yugoslavia's entire reform program, however, centers
around the concept of workers' self-management. According to Section
VIII of the Preamble to the 1963 Federal Constitution, one of the goals
of Yugoslavia's multi-target mix2 8 is to introduce broad participation in
decision making through social self-government and workers' self-management. Under the more recent changes, the workers have gained
more control and the Directors have lost some of their broad powers. 29

25. A.

DRAGNICH, TITO'S PROMISED LAND: YUGOSLAVIA

172 (1954).

26. See generally, D. RUSINOW, THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT, 1948-74, 23-31

(1977).
27. F. SINGLETON, supra note 24, at 159-62.
28. Multi-target mix is the result sought through economic policies; i.e., low unemployment and stable prices.
29. F. SINGLETON, supra note 24, at 269-70.
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Although the Yugoslav approach "is only one among many possible
ways of organizing socialist market decisions processes," 3 the actual
system is more "radical" than market socialism in some ways, as will
be explained below.
Yugoslavia is a dual-preference economic system closely approximating Lange's ideal model."' Consumers affect not only short run but
also long run production and investment decisions. In other words, the
State's rank of priorities places more emphasis on fulfilling consumer
demand patterns. Investment decisions, a significant proportion of
which are transferred to the enterprises, will be based upon expected
profitability which is, in turn, determined by consumer demand for particular goods.
This reorientation towards workers' self-management developed
with the advent of the 1965 Reform Legislation, when the role of the
central planners and party hierarchy was again reduced. 32 For example, the shift from the former so-called "New System" (1953-1964)
"implied a drastic curtailment of the central government's role in the
pooling and disbursing of investments. '3' The result was that the firm
retained seventy-one percent of net profits as compared with fifty-one
percent during the pre-Reform period. 34 Therefore, potential investment funds at the enterprise level increased, while the State's share
was based on the imposition of a profits tax rather than on a transfer of
investment funds. Figure I provides a summary of the major changes in
emphasis which have taken place in Yugoslavia as its economy has
decentralized.3 5

30. B. WARD, THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY: A STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL ALTER182 (1967).
31. See 0. LANGE & F. TAYLOR, supra note 19.
32. See Bicanic, Economics of Socialism in a Developed Country, 44 FOR. AFF.
633 (1966), for an excellent description of this sweeping reform program.
NATIVES

33. N.

SPULBER, SOCIALIST

TIVE SOCIALIST ECONOMICS

MANAGEMENT

&

PLANNING:

TOPICS IN COMPARA-

15 (1971).

34. See M. GAMARNIKOW, ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE 73 (1968).
35. From D. GORUPIC & I. PAJ, WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT IN YUGOSLAV
UNDERTAKINGS

28 (1970).
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FIGURE I

1947-52

1953-64

1965-

1-The directive and organizational role of the State
2-The plan
3-The market
4-Undertaking autonomy
5-Self-organization of the economy
Despite the decentralization trend, fiscal and monetary controls, as
prescribed by the market socialist model, are still used to promote economic growth in critical and unstable sectors. More recent events"
seem to indicate a tightening of these economic controls, especially taxation,"7 in order to stabilize Yugoslavia's ailing economy and to forestall worker resentment due to the "conspicuous consumption" of some
overly consumer-oriented citizens.3 8 But the increased importance of
consumer sovereignty will no doubt remain intact due to its crucial impact on the success of the system. The Reform's

36. See P. JONAS, TAXATION OF MULTINATIONALS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 29-

40 (1978); Jelcic, Taxation of Foreign Persons in Yugoslavia, 24 EUR. TAX. 39 (1984).
37. For example, responsibility for collection of taxes was shifted to the municipalities, affording better control and easier administration. P. JONAS and Jelcic, supra
note 36.
38. See Anderson, Belgrade Shuns New "Stalinism," N. Y. Times, Nov. 19,
1972, at 5, col. 1.
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workers more incentive to raise productivity and
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but also to give
to lower producessential to promoney. 39

Ivan Maksimovic sums up Yugoslavia's reliance on a dual-preference
system:
[T]he characteristic feature of the present self-management economic model is not the absence of the state as a factor of guidance
and influence on economic trends but the tendency towards an equilibrium of influence of the state authorities and the economy, as
well as towards the use of economic instead of administrative methods of state influence over the economy.'0
Diagrammatically, this is represented in Figure II.
FIGURE II
C,

C2

C3

P
CONSUMER
GOODS

\

p.

INVESTMENT GOODS
39. Anderson, Diners' Club or Just Dinars, Yugoslav Consumer is King, N. Y.
Times, Aug. 16, 1972, at 15, col. 1.
40. Maksimovic, The Economic System and Workers' Self-Management in Yugoslavia, in YUGOSLAV WORKERS' SELFMANAGEMENT 135 (M. Broekmeyer ed. 1970).
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Point E is where the State's indifference curve (S.) intersects the
consumers' aggregate indifference curve (C) at the highest preference
for the consumers within the constraint of the economy's production
possibility frontier (PP'). Given the heavier weight on consumer preference, E will be to the northwest along this frontier.4 1 IfState preferences were supreme, the point of equilibrium would move down the
curve to the southeast and consumer satisfaction would fall to C, as
State satisfaction rises to S4 (point E').
The final result is a system similar to Lange's in its reliance on
market mechanisms to determine prices.4 It does so to an even greater
extent than Lange envisioned, however, and this generates problems in
and of itself. For instance, Wiles characterizes the Yugoslav approach
as a system of "mixed rationality" in that the law of determining value
through market prices does not operate perfectly in the real world.' 3 As
Ward points out, only "[i]f markets were perfectly competitive [would]
the new Yugoslav system with profits maximization . . .lead to the
same allocative result as market socialism,"' 44 for then the "rule" of
setting price equal to marginal cost (P.= MC) would be fulfilled. The
planners are limited to economic controls, however, and they undoubtedly face problems similar to those of their Western counterparts in
achieving more perfect competition.
C.

Deviations from Market Socialism

There are a number of important distinctions between market socialist theory and Yugoslav practice. While Lange assumes free consumer and occupational choice, his model does not relinquish the socialist invective against private property. In Yugoslavia, on the other
hand, firms with fewer than five employees may be privately owned as
may be farms of a certain limited acreage. Additionally, Yugoslavia
emphasizes social ownership, rather than public (or State) ownership.4'
Direct State administration has ended with the depoliticization of eco-

41. This, of course, assumes full utilization of resources as well as the theoretical
ability to aggregate communal preferences. Without full resource utilization, point E
would lie to the left and within the P-P' curve. Note that the State indifference curves
(Sp S2 S3. and S4 ) indicate an inherent preference for investment goods, naturally
arising out of a State's defense and international prestige concerns.
42. A "social dividend" is also distributed in the form of communal goods, framework and allocative activities and welfare programs, all in accordance with the market
socialist model.
43. See Wiles, in VALUE AND PLAN, supra note 20, at 187.
44. Ward, in VALUE AND PLAN, supra note 21, at 151 (emphasis in original).
45. See Kamusic, Economic Efficiency and Workers' Self-Management, in YuGOSLAV WORKERS' SELFMANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 79.
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nomic decision-making. " Thus, ownership in Yugoslavia can no longer
be thought of in terms of the State. Society is the theoretical owner of
productive resources and it places its proxy for control into the hands of
both the State and the individual firms.
The most significant difference between the Yugoslav system and
market socialism is the workers' self-management system which, of
course, does not square with Lange's assumption that the managers
work for the Stite.47 Thus, under Lange's theory, it is possible for the
State to enforce the "rules" of cost minimization and marginal cost
pricing. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the Directors and managers
theoretically are directly responsible to the workers through each enterprise's works council. Nevertheless, the management may not be as responsible to worker's interests as they purportedly are in theory. 48 At
the same time, however, management has become more independent of
State control. The interests of workers are more clearly accounted for
by their representatives through the recent partitioning of enterprises
into working sub-units ("Basic Organizations of Associated Labor"). "9
Except for workers' self-management, Yugoslavia's divergence
from market socialism is not all that significant and may be seen as the
sum of particular reactions to the country's unique problems."' Before
examining the effects of workers' self-management on the operation of
the firm under market socialism by a comparison of the actual operation of a Yugoslav enterprise with that of an Hungarian enterprise, we
must now turn to an examination of Hungary's market socialist system
which will serve as the "control" for this comparison.

46. Bicanic characterized the 1965 Reform by the terms "Decentralization, Deetatization, Depoliticization, and Democratization." See Bicanic, supra note 32.
47. See 0. LANGE & F. TAYLOR, supra note 19.
48. Benjamin Ward, especially, concluded that, in the early stages of development, "the workers as a whole [did] not really play a very great role, even indirectly, in
the management of the firm." He did see signs of their growing influence, however, and
more recent state intervention has increased the effectiveness of workers' councils. The
latter also became more assertive as they grew more accustomed to their role. See
Ward, Workers' Management in Yugoslavia, 48 J. POL. ECON. 377 (1957). Gorupic

and Paj reported that, as of 1969, approximately 30 percent of all workers took part in
various bodies of enterprise management. Production workers composed 70.5 percent of
workers' councils, 55.3 percent of management boards and 55.5 percent of the chairmen of workers' councils. See D. GORUPIC & I. PAJ, supra note 35, at 70.
49. See Orbe III, The Multinational in Yugoslavia, 19 INT'L LAW. 623, 625, 626
(1985).

50. As mentioned previously, the differences in reliance on the market are differences of degree only and not major alterations from market socialist theory. The toleration of small privately owned businesses and farms, for example, was due to the failure
of forced collectivization.
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V.

HUNGARIAN

A.

MARKET SOCIALISM

History

On January 1, 1968, the New Economic Mechanism ("NEM")
was formally instituted in Hungary. 1 It marked a definite break with
rigid central planning and the beginning of market socialism in that
country. In one sense, Hungary was trying to find a "happy medium"
between the economic systems of the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. Because the inclusion of any form of workers' self-management was considered taboo, Hungary has come even closer to the pure model of market socialism than has Yugoslavia.
The NEM experiment did not require an actual political break
with the Soviet Union to manifest itself. The inefficiency and wastefulness of the Soviet-type command system was impetus enough. 2 In a
small country such as Hungary, the effects of improper resource allocation and unbalanced development showed up much more quickly and
made a more obvious impression than in a large and resource-rich
country such as the Soviet Union. At first, piecemeal reforms were attempted in 1956-57." Each reform addressed a different problem; but
without any integrated plan, some of the reforms, such as bonuses, incentives and centralization of monetary and fiscal affairs, were counterproductive to each other. Enterprises actually had to oppose certain reforms for fear that the new and inadequate controls would result in
problems for the delivery of inputs. For example, since the reforms
were only partial, deliveries were neither compulsory nor was a working
market system in place to weed-out by competitive forces those suppliers who did not deliver. Hence, the "fundamental drawbacks [of the
Soviet system] were not changed."" George Feiwel's conclusion (concerning Czechoslovakia during the same time period) that "halfway,
inconsistent measures have more adverse effects than retaining the
traditional planning system," 55 applies equally well to the results of the
1956-57 reforms in Hungary.
It was finally recognized that a well-prepared, comprehensive reform program was necessary. The Central Committee of the Hun-

51. P. TOMA & I. VALGYER, POLITICS IN HUNGARY 32-33 (1977).
52. J. RADVANYI, HUNGARY AND THE SUPERPOWERS: THE 1956
AND REALPOLITIK 154-55 (1971).

REVOLUTION

53. Berend, supra note 16, at 87. For a description of the actual measures taken
in early 1957, see Portes, The Strategy and Tactics of Economic Decentralization,
1972 SOVIET STUD. 637-39.

54. Berend, supra note 16, at 87.
55. G. FEIWEL, NEW ECONOMIC
GROWTH, PLANNING AND THE MARKET

PATTERNS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: IMPACT OF

128 (1968).
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garian Socialist Workers' Party (i.e., the Communist Party) set up
working groups to investigate the available alternatives and approaches.
By 1967, a program was developed, approved and slated for commencement in 1968.58 As Joseph Szabados noted, "It [was] probably the
most carefully prepared and thoroughgoing economic reform in Eastern
Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia's." 57
B.

Reforms

In many ways, Hungarian planners learned a lesson from the Yugoslav experience and planned their reforms even more carefully. For
example, the strategy was to ease the NEM into operation with various
administrative controls as safeguards, and then to gradually release the
controls. 5 s The Reform itself was not instituted to develop an absolutely
free-market economy. Its aim was to create a more rational economic
system through more decentralized decision-making and a closer working relationship between central planning and market-determined
prices.59 Thus, the Central Committee resolved in May, 1966, that
"[p]rices . . . were to correspond to supply and demand within the
framework of state priorities . . . [and] world market prices were eventually to prevail." 60
To achieve the long-range goal of a more efficient. socialist system
which could effectively meet both State and consumer preferences, the
reforms were organized around three medium-range goals: to speed up
balanced economic growth; to improve technological development; and
to stimulate foreign trade.6 1 The actual means being used to achieve
these goals comprise the Reform itself, and are summarized as follows.
First, the central plan specifies policy directives for major targets
and investment priorities which are, as in Yugoslavia, mostly indicative
innature.12 The remaining administrative controls serve more as con-

56. W.

SHAWCROSS,

JANAS

KADAR

AND

THE POLITICS

OF HUNGARY

SINCE

112 (1974).
57. Szabados, Hungary's NEM: Promises and Pitfalls 17 E.

REVOLUTION

EUR. 25 (1968). It is
important to note, however, that the NEM is by no means simply "a modification of

the existing system, ... [it is] a wholesale reform of the entire economy."

58. See id.
59. See Gati, Hungary: The Politics of Reform, 60 CURRENT HIST. 293 (1971).
60. Szabados, Hungary's NEM: Reorganization or Basic Reform?, 17 E. EUR. 13
(1968).
61. In this respect, the actual preference mix in Hungary, if it were to be indicated on Figure II, would be further to the southeast along the P-P' frontier than it is
in Yugoslavia.
62. For a good description of one type of indicative planning, see Kindleberger,
French Planning, in COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 204-20.
Nicholas Spulber has compared Hungary with Yugoslavia under the "New System"
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straints than as outright commands and are used to reconcile national
interests with decisions made in the markets. As the Party's then-chief
economic expert, Rezso Nyers, emphasized, the central planning bureau only sets long-term goals while leaving the firm to work out the
details under market conditions.8 8 Hence, decision-making is considerably decentralized and significant autonomy has reverted to the enterprise level. Besides the freedom of what to buy and sell (which, it is
hoped, will increase competition), managers also have more freedom to
determine labor and wage policies within the framework of the new
labor law." These developments are all the result of the Central Committee plenum resolution of May 27, 1966, providing for:
a) new principles of planning and management that will give a
greater independence to directors of enterprises; b) a new system of
wages and prices in which the essentials of centralized control are
to be combined with a degree of flexibility granted to individual
enterprises; c) greater attention is to be paid to the needs of the
market and effective demand is to be reflected in the production
plans; and d) all the existing bureaucratic superstructure between
the level of the ministries and that of the individual enterprise is to
be abolished. 5
Second, prices are to reflect more accurately real expenditures for
material, labor and capital. To achieve this, goods are divided into
three classes. The prices of raw materials and some consumer goods are
to remain officially fixed. Most other consumer prices are to be permitted to float between centrally-planned floors and ceilings. Also, certain
goods, such as luxury items, are entirely free to fluctuate according to
supply and demand. Those prices not originally freed were to be gradually loosened. Thus, 23% of domestic trade took place under free price
conditions by June, 1958 (20% were freed and the remainder were controlled to some extent), compared to 15% before the NEM.6 6 By 1969,

(1954-64) in that central plans are not binding. Since 1968, firms may fix individual
targets given market conditions and the constraint of federal wage, price, credit, and
taxation policies. See N. SPULBER, supra note 33, at 15.
63. From speech reprinted in Nepszabadsag (Budapest), July 26, 1966. See M.
GAMARNIKOW, supra note 34, at 57.

64. See Solyom-Fekete, Hungary's New Labor Code, 17 E. EUR. 17-20 (1968),
for a description of the October 1967 regulations. In brief, they granted management
the right to determine the number of workers to be hired and negotiate with the unions
on wage scales and profit shares. The State still retained the right to intervene in problem areas, and there was a limit on wage increases.
65. M. GAMARNIKOW, supra note 34, at 56.
66. See Current Developments, Hungary 16 E. EUR. 41 (1967); Szabados, supra
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33% of all consumer prices had been freed, 6 7 and it was recognized that
price controls on consumer goods were only "a temporary means for
dealing with particular disequilibria."' With regard to these policies,
then, Hungary is still closely adhering to the market socialist model.
Third, the proportion of centrally determined investments are to be
decreased under the NEM as State controls are switched from administrative to economic means, such as price, wage and credit policies.
Here, again, Hungary resembles not only Yugoslavia, but Lange's
scheme as well, which calls for "the central authorities achieving the
results they desire by 'economic means' " as the socialist economy "develops and matures." 69 The actual reforms called for bank credits to be
awarded on the basis of efficiency and profitability, with interest
charged accordingly.
Fourth, the firm itself is to have more control over its net income.
Three funds were therefore established in each enterprise: (a) a profitsharing or participation fund; (b) a development fund for investment,
social contributions and local taxes determined by a fixed proportion of
the income residual left after profit-sharing; and (c) a reserve fund
equal to a percentage of (a) and (b). Economic controls on profit-sharing are imposed through taxation to insure adequate investment. To
discourage high wages at the expense of investment, "absolute average
wage control" adds the excess of the firm's average wage bill (over the
firm's average wage for some base year) to its taxable profits. 70 The
participation fund is then taxed according to its size in relation to the
total wage bill. The development fund is taxed according to variable
rates, depending upon the type of business. 71 The total effect of taxation, however, is to encourage the efficient use of material resources by
making the firm's retention ratio a function of its capital-labor ratio
while controlling inflation and unemployment.

note 60, at 14.
67. "Hungary: Where Reform Goes Quietly On," Economist, Nov. 15, 1969, at
41. In contrast, it should be noted that twelve years after the Yugoslav reforms began,
two-thirds of all industrial goods were traded under controlled prices in Yugoslavia.
See Ward, Political Power and Economic Change in Yugoslavia, 58 AM. ECON. REV.
(Papers and Proceedings) 571 (1968).
68. Portes, Economic Reforms in-Hungary, 60 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers and Proceedings) 308 (1970).
69. Bornstein, in COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 169.
70. See Portes, supra note 68, at 307-13.
71. Some private enterprise is tolerated in Hungary just as in Yugoslavia, but it is
even less important than in the latter. Again, it was found that particular conditions
necessitated some tolerance of such institutions, especially the need to attract artisans
to backward areas. See Gamarnikow, The New Role of Private Enterprise, 16 E. EUR.
6 (1967).
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Fifth, tight control over foreign exchange is continued, and hence
trade continues to be burdened with political necessity. However, the
forint was devalued by setting up new multiple exchange rates, thereby
increasing exports so that Hungary's balance of trade would improve.
Further, more flexible and efficient trade regulations were instituted to
allow the firms to trade from a more competitive position on world
markets.
One distinct divergence from market socialism revolves around the
policy of income distribution.7 2 In contrast to the limited inequality
presumed by the market socialist model, there have been public warnings against any tendency towards egalitarianism in wages. At the November 29, 1969 plenum of the Central Committee, for example, Rezso
Nyers reiterated the NEM principle of "differentiation according to
73
work performed.1
As in Yugoslavia, such a divergence was in response to a particular problem, which in Hungary's case was the lagging productivity of
labor. Other than this major inconsistency, the interaction of the market and the central planning authorities in Hungary has been quite
close to that envisioned in the market socialist model. Hence, we can
use Hungary as our control model and compare the workings of a firm
under the NEM with that of a Yugoslav firm, which also works in a
market socialist environment, but with the addition of the workers' selfmanagement concept.
VI.

LABOR MANAGEMENT AND THE BEHAVIOR OF THE FIRM UNDER
MARKET SOCIALISM

A.

The Operating Principle

It is generally recognized that a firm operates in a capitalist economic system with the primary goal (in theory) of maximizing profits.
The operating principle of any firm, including a joint venture, is central

to an understanding of how it is run, since all major decisions will keep
profit maximization in mind. It is the decision-maker in the firm who
formulates the principle for any particular economic system. It is the
entrepreneur who determines "the main avenues of economic
growth, '7 4 and bears the concomitant risks and uncertainty in return

72. Hungary is also more "radical" than the pure Lange model, as its output
targets are no longer centrally determined by rigid directions. Thus, it really appears
more like the Lerner model in which profitability is the guiding force. Nonetheless, the
system works with a measure of central control more closely approximating Lange's
mix than does the economy presently operative in Yugoslavia.
73. Current Developments, Hungary 19 E. EUR. 39 (1970).
74. N. SPULBER, supra note 33, at xvi.
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for the resulting profits. 5 A look at where the entrepreneurial function
lies in our two models will help determine their respective operating
principles.
Under the labor-managed system of present-day Yugoslavia,
[tihe worker performs the function of a collective businessman
since he carries out selfmanagement together with other workers,..
• . [S]elfmanagement in fact unites in one single function what,
under conditions of privately organized production, is performed by
two special socio-economic subjects - the owner of the capital and
76
the owner of the labour force.
Herbert Grubel asserts that public ownership of the means of production should result in the Government performing the role of the entrepreneurial decision-maker and bearing the necessary risks." He
would probably only go so far as to assign the worker-managers the
operational (or "operative-managerial") function - "the task of combining inputs and of producing outputs in some accordance with de78
mand intensities and supply scarcities.
Yet, the decentralization of decision-making and the institution of
profit-sharing has, whether for good or for ill, increased the risks involved for the workers.7 9 A worker's net income depends on his (or his
representative's) decisions. Hence, the entrepreneurial function has
been considerably diffused through society. Although the Government's
obligations and functions in the economy may have been curtailed, the
State remains the owner of social capital and hence no one undertaking

75. The entrepreneur may be viewed as the innovator creating profits. As risks
fall on the owner of capital, which may or may not be the same person as the entrepreneur, a duality may result which is significant for the operations of a joint venture in a
market socialist system. See B. HORVAT, TOWARDS A THEORY OF PLANNED ECONOMY
114-15 (1964).
76. Maksimovic, in

YUGOSLAV WORKERS' SELFMANAGEMENT,

supra note 40, at

136.
77. Grubel, Comments (on The Nationalized Firm in Yugoslavia, by Benjamin
Ward), 55 AM. ECON. REV. 78 (1965). He believes that the ideological basis of workers' self-management creates a conflict between state interests and the goals of the
workers. See also Dunn, supra note 16.
78. N. SPULBER, supra note 33, at xvi.

79. As one commentator has noted, in contrast to a "capitalist co-operative," entrepreneurial control is in the hands of those supplying the labor input in a "producer
co-operative." Since net revenue may be negative, the suppliers of the input performing
the entrepreneurial function will share the risks. See Dubravcic, Labour as Entrepreneurial Input: An Essay in the Theory of the Producer Co-operative Economy,
37 ECONOMICA 297 (1970).
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can extract the full profits for itself.8 0 Whether or not one views the
State (or society) as a partner in entrepreneurship (as the owner of
capital), the Yugoslav firm does not reap the full rewards of production. It pays a price - interest or a fixed rent - on the socially-owned
capital used and it must also make contributions for the development of
the community.8"
With labor providing the entrepreneurial input in a labor-managed

economy (using Dubravcic's producer co-operative scheme), the worker
will wish to maximize the efficiency of his input in terms of the firm's
net revenue. Hence, if net income, D, is equal to the value of total
product or output ("VTP") less the costs of operating the firm in a
labor-managed co-op (TC1 ) (i.e., D = VTP - TCI), entrepreneurial
82
efficiency (E) in a one-output-two-input case will be:
D
E =

D

Pxx - iK

--

L

L

=

net income

L = labor force
Px = price of product x
i = interest rate
K

=

capital employed

Dubravcic asserts that "net labor productivity" (E) is the "maximand"
for the labor-managed firm because there is no wage rate set by the

firm. The workers obtain their reward as the suppliers of labor by dividing the firm's residual income after non-labor costs, which is why
wages are not subtracted from the above formula. 83

To obtain the maximum individual income, the supplier of the entrepreneurial input, in this case labor, will want to maximize net revenue per labor unit. In other words, the operating principle of the labor-

managed firm is the maximization of the average income per worker.
80. See Ward, Marxism-Horvatism:A Yugoslav Theory of Socialism: A Review
Article, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 512 (1967). See also D. GORUPIC & I. PAJ, supra note 35,

at 46-47.
81. Note also that the community still bears a part of the risk because it supports
a minimum wage for unsuccessful firms. See B. HORVAT, supra note 75, at 120. See
also Domar, The Soviet Collective Form as a Producer Cooperative, 56 AM. ECON.
REV. 734, 737 (1966). Finally, one can subtract the cost of other inputs to produce an
even more complicated model. See J. VANEK, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LABOR-MANAGED MARKET ECONOMICS 23-24 (1970).
82. The formula for a co-op in general is entrepreneurial efficiency (E) equals net
revenue (D) divided by the amount of entrepreneurial input (L). In the above formula,

L is the labor force, Px is the price of the product x and i is the interest charged on
capital (K). See Dubravicic, supra note 79, at 300. More than one output (PiXi) can

also be accomodated for in this formula.
83. Ordinarily, TC 1 should equal iK + wL, thereby implying that wages are a
cost to be subtracted in deriving productivity. This is not the case in a theoretical
model in which labor is the entrepreneurial factor dividing profits instead of wages.
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This is only natural, say Gorupic and Paj, for "the material interest of
individuals and social needs are the main motive powers underlying
economic activity. 8'" 4 Ward calls it "that dependable human motivation: self-interest," 85 while Domar softens the implications by noting
that "co-op members are likely to be ordinary human beings bent on
maximizing the benefits from their participation in the co-op." 8 6
Vanek adds, however, that just as in the capitalist system, there is
no one all-encompassing motive. A broader conception of the motivation principle could include maximizing growth, surplus value or even
employment 87 since the absorption of community unemployment may
be seen as a "positive good." 88 Income maximization is also subject to
the constraints of desired leisure time and improvement of working
conditions. But, on the whole, Vanek concludes that
[t]he principle of maximization of income per man is operative in
Yugoslavia in the longer-range policies of the labor-managed firms,
and especially if we think of the broader interpretation where income is not only monetary income.8 9
Perhaps the most important point to bear in mind is that other motives
should not be in conflict with this maximand. For example, attempting
to maximize aggregate net income (i.e., profits) could be in conflict
with our central operating principle if it involved business operations
beyond the point where the marginal cost of labor equals its marginal
revenue (MCL = MRL). As shown in Figure III, this might actually
involve production corresponding to a point (E) at which the marginal
cost of employing additional workers to maximize profits is higher than
the average dividend rate currently earned. This depends on the labor
structure which determines the position of the marginal labor cost
curve (MCL). Hence, average income for all workers involved would
fall (assuming that income net of non-labor costs and rent is divided
equally among all members of the producer co-op and wages are nonexistent). Instead, production will take place at point (F) where income
per worker is maximized within the constraints of the labor supply.
84. D. GORUPIC & I. PAJ, supra note 35, at 23 (emphasis in original).
85. B. WARD, supra note 30, at 65.

86. Domar, supra note 81, at 734.
87.

J. VANEK, THE PARTICIPATORY ECONOMY: AN EVOLUTIONARY HYPOTHESIS

12-14 (1971).
88. Vanek, Decentralization under Workers' Management: A Theoretical Appraisal, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 1013 (1969).
AND A STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

89. J. VANEK, supra note 87, at 43. In this author's view, incentives based on
expectation of promotion are inferior in quality because they are so dependent on the
more uncertain and subjective judgments of one's superiors.
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FIGURE III
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Hungary presents an entirely different picture in that its dual preference mix places greater weight on State preferences. Through both
administrative and economic controls, the State can impose its own
standards on the firm which results in the State having more power and
the workers less. Through their performance, workers can earn extra
income in the form of profit shares, but they do not have enough control over the operation of the firm to arrange production in such a way
as to maximize their net income (wages plus profit shares).
The managers, on the other hand, do have such power. Commen-
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surate with their increased responsibility under the NEM, the managers stand to gain or lose much more than the workers by their decisions." They bear greater risks than the workers and, combined with
their decision-making powers, they are entitled to their larger profitshares by right of their greater entrepreneurial input. 1 In effect, the
entrepreneurial function in Hungary is shared between two principal
sets of actors, the managers and the State.
The State exercises its entrepreneurial responsibilities through a
set of administrative and economic controls which will be explained below. The managers, however, maximize their income by maximizing
the firm's profits within the constraints of the market and the State
controls. This should be obvious since much of their income is from the
profit-sharing fund. There are naturally other incentives such as promotion, but they tend to be subordinate to income maximization. Hence,
the Hungarian firm is comparable to a profit-maximizing firm in which
the goal is profit, o, and in which: 9
o
PxX-iK- wL
Given these two operating principles, some of the implications for the
Yugoslav joint venture and its Hungarian counterpart may now be
investigated.
B.

Employment and Production

In the one output-one variable input model used by Ward, 9 workers' self-management evokes a strange response to a change in input
and output prices - a downward sloping supply curve (i.e., negative
elasticity). Obviously, if replicated in practice, a very unstable condition would arise with any divergence from equilibrium. For example, as
shown in Figure IV, should the supply curve S-S' be even more negatively elastic than demand (D-D'), any change from equilibrium at
point E would either (a) continue to drive prices up as demand outpaced supply; or (b) drive them down unhindered as supply outpaced
demand. Actual results, of course, depend upon assumptions concerning

90. See Szabados, supra note 57, at 30. There is usually "a clear link between
income differentiation on one side and entrepreneurial functions and risk bearing on the
other." M. GAMARNIKOW, supra note 34, at 181.
91. "The entrepreneurial duties and rewards of any member of the co-operative
will be proportional to the amount of entrepreneurial input he supplies." Dubravcic,
supra note 79, at 298.
92. Where PX is the price of product X, X is the output of the same, iK is the
interest ratio multiplied by the amount of capital employed, and wL is the wage rate
multiplied by the amount of labor employed.
93. See Ward, The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism, 43 Am. EcON. REv. 566
(1953).
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the pricing process, since in some cases a stable equilibrium could
prevail.
FIGURE IV
PRICE

0
QUANTITY
This negatively sloped supply curve results from the fact that in
this simple model" an increase in the output price raises the dividend

94. Which assumes: (1) all non-labor inputs are bought and all outputs sold by the
co-op at parametric prices; (2) the production function of the co-op would yield a stable equilibrium under perfect competition; (3) the co-op pays an annual fixed rent, R
= 0; (4) instead of wages, income net of non-labor costs and rent are divided equally
among members as a dividend; (5) the object is maximization of average income per
worker; and (6) the co-op can actually employ the optimum number of workers needed
to maximize its dividends. See Domar, supra note 81, at 736-37.
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rate more than the marginal product of labor (VMPL). 9 5 Domar shows
this mathematically as follows: 9" if net labor productivity,

a =

Aa
Aa /

Pxx

-

L

Px

PxxX

x

Pxx - iK

iK

, then

a = net labor productivity
Px = price of product x

i = interest rate
K = capital employed

>Iwhen iK > 0

Since it has been assumed that ik, the fixed "rent" for funds, is greater
than zero, 97 the relative change in average income per worker is greater
than the relative change in the output price. Figure V illustrates this
graphically."

95. In Vanek's more comprehensive model, the average value of product added of
labor - equal to X (Px - PNn)/L, where N is an input other than capital fixed in
proportion to output by the coefficient n - rises more than the marginal value product
added of labor equal to MPPL (Px - PNn). See J. VANEK, supra note 81, at 23-24.
96. See the Appendix to Domar, supra note 81, at 753-56.
97. See note 94 supra.
98. Adapted from Domar, supra note 81, at 740, Appendix Figure 2.
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FIGURE V
LABOR

INPUT
(IN DINARS)

L2

L,

Labor Force

a - net labor productivity
VMP - value of marginal product

By changing the labels by substituting average product curves for
net labor productivities (a, and a2), marginal product of labor (MP
and MP 2 ) for value of marginal product of labor (VMP 1 and VMP 2),
and labeling the y-axis "output", one can observe that the decreased
employment is accompanied by a decrease in production.
Despite such mathematical gymnastics, workers' self-management
does not yield such results in reality for two major reasons. First, more
than one product is usually produced. This results in a positively sloped
supply curve. 9 '

99. From J.

VANEK,

supra note 81, at 54, Figure 3.5.1.
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FIGURE VI

L-

L,

L

L,

labor force

L4

x2

Figure VI graphically represents a firm producing two products, X,
and X2, with one variable input, labor (L, < L2 < L3 < L4) and a
fixed capital supply. Should the price of X, increase relative to X 2, the
firm will shift production from point a to a' in accordance with the
change in the price or exchange ratios, f-f and f-f. The output of X,
therefore increases in contrast to the previous analysis involving only
one product. The new expansion path, e'-e', can be used to derive the
new dividend curve which will be greater than before since total employment is still L4 while the value of the total output is now higher
with the increase in the price of good X,. Depending on the subsequent
increase in the value of marginal product of labor (VMPL), employment may even rise as shown in Figure VII.10 0

100. Adapted from id., at 55, Figure 3.5.2.
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FIGURE VII

LABOR INPUT
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L - labor force
VMPL - value of
marginal product
of labor
While it is theoretically possible for L' to be below Lo in Figure
VII, it is unlikely because of the second divergence of reality from the
one output-one variable input theoretical model - the existence of
more than one variable input. Vanek's model takes this into account in
his more complex formulation and finds that where there are other possible recombinations of inputs, a "social short and long-run adjustment" will occur. 101
With labor ostensibly the major beneficiary in a workers' self-managed system, a reduction in the labor force of a firm will be rare as will
be negative supply elasticities. While layoffs have been noted, 0 the

101. See id., at 56-57. As Ivan Maksimovic argues, "The abundance of variables
inherent in Yugoslav economic practice and history destroy the simplicity and consistency of the theoretical model .... ." Maksimovic, in YUGOSLAV WORKERS'
SELFMANAGEMENT, supra note 40, at 132.
102. Ward refers to articles reporting such layoffs in Ekonomska Politika, Borba
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decline in the industrial labor force was rather nominal.1 03 Vanek's
conclusion that there is a significant downward rigidity of employment
appears to be justified and, in any event, Dubravcic notes that

[i]t can be assumed safely that the information available to management - including decision-making techniques - will not be accurate enough to induce them to react to changes in prices in the
04
paradoxical way postulated for the L co-op model ....

As noted above, the firm in Hungary operates under certain administrative constraints set down by the State. Since the initial problem
with any reform of central planning is unemployment,'0 5 the planners
of the NEM established two crucial controls - "absolute average
wage control" (actually a carry-over from the mid-1960s) and a "retention rule" for managers to follow. Average wage control, as explained earlier, 0 6 provides an incentive for managers to keep their average wage rates down. Failing to do so will result in a lower profit
sharing fund after taxes. The retention ratio of the development fund,
in proportion to the profit-sharing fund, is set equal to the firm's capital-labor ratio. This is a further incentive for the manager to produce in
a more labor-intensive fashion as his income is so dependent on the size
of the participation fund. 10 The result which faces the firm is a microsupply curve of labor, S L, such as that in Figure VIII, in which the
supply of labor increases as wages increase, but only up to a certain
point.

and Rad, all in 1967. See Ward, supra note 67, at 573.
103. See Markovic, National Income, Employment and Productivity in the Yugoslav Economy, 1947-1968, 11 YUGOSLAV SURV. 50, 52 (1970).

104. Dubravcic, supra note 79, at 304.
105. Gamarnikow notes that as the system of central planning gave no incentive

to reduce superfluous labor, extra workers were hired for the sole purpose of insuring
that production plans would be fulfilled if there were last minute problems. When profitability becomes the operating principle, these low-productivity workers are released.
Inflation may also result unless competition for the most skilled labor is contained. This
is another rationale for imposing average wage control. See M. GAMARNIKOW, supra
note 34, at 128, 133.
106. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
107. See Portes, supra note 68, at 309.
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FIGURE VIII
WAGES

LABOR
More specifically, because of average wage control, the labor supply curve will be relatively elastic (i.e., responsive to wage-rate
changes). Given low average wages, more workers (especially women)
07 1
will be brought into the labor force to maintain family income.1
And, contrary to the situation facing the Yugoslav firm, there is a positive incentive for the manager to hire this low-cost, low-productivity
labor up to the point where full employment is reached. At this point,
Lx on Figure VIII, increased competition for labor results in more labor turnover and higher wages within the limits set by the State, with,
however, no greater supply of labor in net terms. This is the situation
facing Hungary. 10 8
Limiting our case to a labor surplus situation, the Yugoslav and
Hungarian firms can be compared as in Figure IX below.

107.1 See generally Diehl, Second Jobs Bring Many Hungarians to Good
Life-But at a "Really Tough" Price, L.A. Times, Apr. 20, 1986, § 1, at 16, col. 2 for
recent support of this proposition.
108. See Portes, supra note 53, at 655.
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FIGURE IX
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MCL-marginal cost
of labor
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VAP-value of
average product
L-labor force
Figure IX assumes that the firms produce with the same productivity (an unrealistic assumption which will be dispensed with below).
The Hungarian firm acts as a monopsonist as it has no fixed supply of
labor and is willing to acquire or utilize as much labor resources as are
available and economically efficient on a marginal cost basis. Therefore, it hires up to the point (LH) where the marginal cost of labor
(MCLH marginal to the wage rate SLH) equals the value of that labor's
marginal product (VMPLH). Without the incentives present in the
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Hungarian system, the Yugoslav firm faces a less elastic supply curve.
Since the undertaking will have a fixed supply of labor in the form of
the members of its co-operative, it will hire a complete labor force
along SLY or S'LY. Were the relevant curve to be SLY (or any other
curve where E is to the right of A), only Ly will be hired because that
is where the average income per worker is maximized.
Should the firm face a curve such as S'LY, labor will be hired up to
where it contributes more to average income than to costs (see Figure
III infra as well). In any event, the labor force in a Yugoslav firm will
be less than in an equivalent, theoretical Hungarian one (Ly < LH).
However, as shown in Figure X, the value of the marginal product of
labor in Hungary is less than that in Yugoslavia (VMPH < VMPy)
and the value of the average product of labor in Hungary is less than
that in Yugoslavia (VAPH < VAPy), due to both the Hungarian propensity to hire low-productivity labor, and Yugoslavia's relatively highproductivity labor, a result of its capital-intensive production to be discussed below. 10 9

109. In the early years of the NEM labor productivity increases were a great
disappointment. In Yugoslavia's early period, before the full effects of the 1965 Reform
were felt, productivity grew at different rates, depending on the industry involved. Industrial productivity was on the higher side generally. See Horvat, Yugoslav Economic
Policy in the Post-War Period: Problems, Ideas, Institutional Developments, 63 AM.
ECON. REV. (Supp.: "Surveys of National Economic Policy Issues and Policy Research") 116 (1971).
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Depending on both the supply elasticity of labor and the actual
amounts by which Yugoslav productivity exceeds that of Hungary, the
Yugoslav firm may produce less (Lv'), the same or even more than its
Hungarian counterpart (Ly, LH).
Note that, should the workers' self-managed firm originally find
itself at Ly', an increase in its productivity through the use of more
capital (along its expansion path in Figure XI below) would most probably push it closer to LH in Figure X and towards Ly rather than re-.
ducing employment. This is a result of the natural aversion of workers
to technological developments which tend to displace jobs. If anything,
investment might be used to complement rather than to displace labor,
Therefore, the results of this theoretical analysis are indeterminate.
However, it appears on this evidence that the introduction of workers'
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self-management does not, in and of itself, have a causal effect on either production or employment.
C.

Investment and the Structure of Employment

Turning to the long-term adjustment process, we find that workers'
self-management contains an inherent bias towards capital intensive
production techniques. If both capital and labor can vary over time, the
expansion path of production will be the locus of points tangent to the
isocost lines and production isoquants shown in Figure XI below." 0 If
we assume the production isoquants are the same for any product in
both countries, we can derive the isocost lines as follows:
YUGOSLAVIA

Px x - iK
L
aL = PxX - iK
a

aL -PxX
.K

HUNGARY

a = net labor productivity
Px = price of product
i = interest rate
K = capital employed
L = labor force
W = wage rate
VTP = value of total product
TCpme = total cost of
profit-maximizing enterprises

=

VTP

=

=

=

-iK
) L- +

ix

PxX

0 = Px X - ik - wL
0 = VTP - TCpme
.. VTP - TCpme =
-

PxX

-

iK - wL

TCpme = -iK - wL
TCpme + wL = -iK

*.K = -( wI) L + TCmpe
i
As "a" is greater than the wage rate ("a" being optimum net labor
productivity or a "full wage," including rewards for both entrepreneurial input and labor input), the slope of the expansion path in
Yugoslavia is bound to be greater, i.e., more capital intensive than in
Hungary."'

110. An isocost line identifies all possible combinations of inputs (capital and labor in this model) when total cost is held constant. An isoquant curve traces all combinations of capital and labor that generate a specified level of output.
11. See Dubravcic, supra note 79, at 303. Note that Figure XI postulates that
both expansion paths will eventually curve back to a more balanced mix for reasons to
be discussed below.
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Ward reaches the same conclusion:
The Illyrian firm will have a tendency to invest in more capitalintensive processes than its [profit-maximizing] counterpart, even to
the point of occasionally investing under conditions in which profits
(but not profits per worker) are expected to fall as a result." 2
This obviously leads to a misallocation of resources and, if carried
to its extreme, results in firms operating high up on their respective
average cost curves with extensive under-utilization of capacity. But as
the labor-managed firm will be especially sensitive to risks as well as to
investments resulting in a loss of jobs, such excessive capital-intensive
investment would probably be ameliorated in practice. Since under-uti-

112. B. WARD, supra note 30, at 212. This has resulted in a general slow down of
the per annum percentage increase in employment (outside of private agriculture). See
Horvat, supra note 109, at 91, Table 3.
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lized investments involve higher fixed costs (in terms of overhead and
maintenance) not covered by any subsequent production, average income would be lowered and investments of this sort would in turn be
contained within limits." 13
Conversely, the Hungarian firm, with its proclivity towards laborintensive production, also tends to misallocate resources. Besides the
incentive of average wage control, "growing production needs and 'false
humanitarianism' influenced many enterprises to keep or expand their
work force.""' 4 More recent incentives to transfer surplus labor have
been initiated but may not have been fully felt at all levels of the economy as yet. There may also have been a slight trend towards more
capital investment. 15 Although the results are inconclusive and recent
statistical data would be required to support the hypothesis, it appears
that Yugoslav capital investment is higher than that in Hungary, concomitant to Yugoslavia's capital-intensive propensity relative to a Hungarian profit-maximizing firm.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis presents two broad categories of conclusions. First, the differences between the operation of a workers' selfmanaged firm and a profit-maximizing firm, both producing under
market socialism, are indeterminate. Depending on the labor supply
curves facing each firm and the relative productivity of that labor, the
workers' self-managed firm might produce more or less (and hire more
or fewer workers) than its Hungarian counterpart. In any event, the
differences are probably small because of practical considerations
which concurrently shift the two closer together.
Second, the differences in output, employment and investment priorities between the two models are not due solely to the introduction of
workers' self-management into the market socialist environment. The
administrative measures, such as average wage control, which have
been instituted in Hungary to combat certain problems accentuate the
differences. If these controls were eliminated and taxes equalized the
size of both firms' profit-sharing funds, the two would operate at more
nearly comparable levels.
Even here, however, the results are indeterminate because the labor supply curves may again differ with different outputs, even though

113.
Yugoslav
114.
115.

For data which supports this supposition, see Percent of Capacity used by
Firms 1965, 1966, 9 YUGOSLAV SURV. 85 (1968).
Racz, Assessing Hungary's Economic Reforms, 17 E. EUR. 4 (1968).
See generally F. SINGLETON, supra note 24, at 150-66.
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the VAPL and VMPL may be identical.1 1 6 However, since the Yugoslav
firm operates in a labor surplus economy where labor (even of a quality
comparable to Hungarian labor) should be cheaper, it may face a relatively more elastic curve than the Hungarian firm operating without
average wage control.11 Therefore, as shown in Figure XII below, the
Yugoslav firm will produce at Ly (where average income per worker is
maximized) given SL as its labor supply curve. It does not reach the
social optimum, e,, yet is no further than the Hungarian firm from its
respective social optimum, e,, when the latter produces at LH.
Even if the elasticities of both were the same at point SLY, Hungary would still produce and hire less since it must use its marginal
curve to maximize profits. The result is indeterminate again but may,
in fact, bring the firms closer together in their actual operation.

116. See Figure IX infra page 119. Indeed, it has been noted that employment
has expanded in Yugoslavia by over 1,700,000 jobs in the past ten years and that its
unemployment problem "is considerably less severe than other developing countries."
Orbe Ill, supra note 49, at 625, 637-38. The fundamental problem stemming from the
theoretical anti-labor intensive bias is far from solved, however. See id. at 634.
117. One might question whether workers with skills equal to those in Hungary
would work for lower wages.
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Hence, while the implications of workers' self-management are numerous when compared to a market socialist model in which necessary
controls of the type utilized in Hungary's NEM are introduced, workers' self-management does not appear to detract significantly from the
firm's operation nor from its production and employment levels. Its propensity towards capital-intensive production is significant, but without
the aforementioned Hungarian controls, the latter would probably
move closer to Yugoslavia in its capital-output ratio than it currently
is. And, in any event, there are intangible rewards from the Yugoslav
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labor-managed system - fewer employee-employer conflicts;" 8 better
organization of collective consumption (e.g., housing, child care services
and recreational activities); an environment more conducive to retraining and on-the-job training; and greater inducement for minor innovations, as the innovator can receive direct benefits from his ideas." 9
These intangibles may help to counteract other adverse effects of workers' self-management.
It is, therefore, possible that, although a Western joint venture
partner would find that a Yugoslav workers' council approaches decisions on a different basis and with different motivations than Western
management would in a capitalist context, the differences may not be
so much due to workers' self-management but to the entire framework
of market socialism. 120 Professor Coughlin's remark that "a deeper understanding" is desirable is thus well taken. Western joint venture partners should clearly expect to face a motivational gap, with resulting
effects on decisions regarding a broad panoply of microeconomic
indicators.
Nonetheless, similar gaps and results may be found in any joint
venture in a market socialist system. As indicated in this study, for
example, a Hungarian joint venture partner might react quite similarly
to a Yugoslav counterpart in various circumstances, even in the absence of workers' self-management.
The next step to further Professor Coughlin's analysis would be to
apply recent, comparable and reliable data to this theory in order to
solve the many indeterminancies I have noted. Of special importance
would be detailed employment figures, capital-labor and capital-output
ratios, breakdowns on workers' income (as between wages and profit
shares), and the like. Such data should also help explain some of the
unanswered or partially answered questions which remain.
Finally, of vital interest would be a recent subjective study comparing Western companies which have actually entered into joint ventures with those which have considered but rejected plans to invest in a
joint venture in either or both Yugoslavia and Hungary. In a commentary on Professor Coughlin's study, two observers summarized a number of studies involving actual investments in Yugoslavia alone. 121
However, they did not also interview companies which had contemplated but did not follow through with similar plans, nor were other

118. See Kamusic, in YUGOSLAV WORKERS' SELFMANAGEMENT, supra note 45, at
98 and 100, Tables V and VII.
119. See Vanek, supra note 88, at 1012; J. VANEK, supra note 87, at 258 and
264.
120. Cf. Orbe III, supra note 49, at 631 (emphasizing a mix of factors).
121. See Artisien & Buckley, supra note 7.
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non-market economy joint ventures studied. Such a comparative empirical study would perhaps better indicate why such joint ventures have
been formed or rejected and where. the difficulties were perceived by
the actual parties to such arrangements. Also, such a study could more
conclusively confirm that workers' self-management played only a
small (if any) role in these decisions and that many of the other factors
which both Professor Coughlin and Professors Artisien and Buckley re122
cite (drawing on previous studies of Yugoslav joint ventures only)
will seem much more important.

122. See Coughlin, supra note 1, at 21-25; Artisien & Buckley, supra note 7, at
168-70. Indeed, one author has commented that Western firms have been hindered as
well by Yugoslavia's "deep-seated fear of the potential abuses of a pervasive multinational presence in the country" and not only by the risk-avoidance behavior inherent in
a workers' self-management system. See Orbe III, supra note 49, at 632-34.
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APPENDIX

KEY TO SYMBOLS
a

-

net labor productivity (entrepreneurial efficiency in labor

co-op)
D

-

net income

i

-

interest rate

K

-

capital employed

L

-

labor force

MCL

-

marginal cost of labor

MRL

-

marginal revenue of labor

MP

-

marginal product of labor

o

-

profit

PX

-

price of product X

TC 1

-

total cost of producer (labor-managed) co-op

TCpme
VAP

-

total cost of profit-maximizing enterprises
value of average product

-

VMPL
VTP

-

value of marginal product of labor
value of total product

w

-

wage rate

X

-

output of product X

H and Y used as subscripts

-

Hungary and Yugoslavia, respectively.

